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PATENT CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AFTER KSM:
HAS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT INFRINGED
PATENTEES' RIGHTS?
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, when a prevailing patent owner' had succeeded in en-
joining an infringer,2 any subsequent modifications of the enjoined object
by that infringer could also be enjoined and punished by contempt.3 The
patentee needed only to show, in relatively uncomplicated proceedings,
that this new device was just a modified version of the enjoined device-
altered slightly to circumvent the injunction.4 A recent decision5 by the
Federal Circuit radically alters the standard of proof in these contempt
proceedings by forcing courts to consider many additional factors before
exercising their discretion.6 The court is less than lucid7 in its failure to
1. Federal patent power stems from the Constitutional provision that "Congress
shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries .... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Patent statutes grant "the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years .... the right to exclude others from
making, using, or seeing the invention throughout the United States .... 35 U.S.C.
§ 154 (1982).
2. The patent statute provides that the courts "may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent ...-
35 U.S.C. § 283 (1982). "Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claim-
ant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement .... ." Id. § 284 (1982).
3. Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.) ("A contempt proceeding for
violation of a patent infringement injunction will lie where the new and alleged offending
device is merely 'colorably' different from the enjoined device or from the patent."), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); see, eg., Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Korbin, 719 F.2d 1114, 1118
(11th Cir. 1983); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 234 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968); Hopp Press, Inc. v. Joseph Freeman & Co., 323
F.2d 636, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1963); E-I-M Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Works, Inc., 223 F.2d
36, 41-42 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 933 (1956).
4. See 8 A. Deller, Deller's Walker on Patents § 735, at 99 (2d ed. Supp. 1985)
("Where an alteration is merely colorable and obviously made simply for the purpose of
evading an earlier ruling of the court, contempt remedies are desirable."). In Hopp Press,
Inc. v. Joseph Freeman & Co., 323 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1963), the defendant modified
infringing price tags by using opaque rather than translucent ink and changed the type-
face of numerals. "If the.., old tag infringed the plaintiff's patent, as it was adjudicated
to have done, we are unable to see why the new tag, which is in every essential aspect
equivalent, does not also infringe." Id. Though infringers are often tempted to modify a
device slightly, so as to evade an injunction, the courts frown on this practice. "The
attempt to see how near one can come to an infringement and escape it involves great
danger, and is not looked upon with favor by courts." Calculagraph Co. v. Wilson, 136 F.
196, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1905).
5. KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
6. The majority holds that it is always necessary to return to the claims and to
consider any questions raised of claim interpretation, prior art, and prosecution
history estoppel.
By rejecting this law and procedure in all cases, whatever the facts, the majority
has changed the practices of the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits, and modi-
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explain how the progeny of this case are to keep "summary" and "con-
tempt" from becoming mutually exclusive terms.
In KSM Fastening Systems v. H.A. Jones Co.,' the Federal Circuit held
that an injunction against infringement is violated only if the patentee
proves that the "new" device is a patent infringement.9 This holding
places the burden of potentially protracted and expensive relitigation' °
on the patent owner and effectively deprives him of the remedy of the
summary contempt proceeding."
Part I of this Note describes the nature and purposes of the patent
contempt action and argues that to sustain its coercive vitality (in pro-
tecting both the rights of the patentee and respect for the authority of the
court) it must be summary in nature and unencumbered by protracted
proceedings. Part II examines the implications of KSM, addresses the
increased burden that a patentee must now bear in contempt proceed-
ings, and shows that much of this weight has been transferred from the
shoulders of the infringer. It concludes that KSM is a harbinger of the
nullification of both respect for court decrees and fear of contempt sanc-
tions in potential contemnors. Part III analyzes alternatives to the KSM
mandate and concludes that in determining if contempt should lie, the
trial could should have the discretion to compare the modified device to
the adjudicated device or to the patent.
fled the discretionary practices of at least the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, and
of trial courts in other circuits ....
Id. at 1533 (Newman, J., concurring in part); see SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775
F.2d 1107, 1127-31 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Sutherland Paper Co. v. Grant Paper Box Co., 183
F.2d 926, 935 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950); see also Borkin, The Patent
Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 634, 641 (1950) (patent litigation
requires expert witnesses because judges are not sufficiently trained in chemistry, physics
and mathematics for the analysis of the fine lines of distinction inherent in patent
litigation).
7. See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part).
8. 776 F.2d 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
9. See id. at 1532 ("[W]hether an injunction against infringement has been violated,
requires, at a minimum, a finding that the accused device is an infringement.").
10. See KSM, 776 F.2d at 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring in part).
"Most of the circuits have heretofore recognized the need for.., courts to handle con-
tempt cases simply and expeditiously .... " Id. Patent litigation and infringement suits
are usually extremely expensive. See Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d
1015, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (summary judgments should be made with an eye toward
judicial economy); King Instruments Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (licensing agreement may be an alternative to unaffordable or expensive patent
litigation), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986); Hairline Creations, Inc.
v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 1981) ("threat of expensive litigation"); Speed
Shore Corp. v. Denda, 605 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[s]ettlement agreements con-
serve judicial time and limit expensive litigation."); Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 673-75 (7th Cir. 1960) (plaintiff compelled to conduct long
and expensive litigation), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 812 (1961); Gould v. General Photonics
Corp., 534 F. Supp. 399, 403 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (defendant preferred alternative of licenc-
ing agreement to expensive litigation that it could not afford).
11. See KSM, 776 F.2d at 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring in part).
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I. THE NATURE OF THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT ACTION
A patent owner who proves infringement is entitled to the relief af-
forded by 35 U.S.C. § 283,12 which authorizes the courts to grant an
injunction 3 to protect the rights of the patentee.' 4 A violation of an
injunction may be punished by contempt. 15 Contempt authority is pro-
12. The statute provides: "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this
title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."
35 U.S.C. § 283 (1982).
13. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides:
Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order. Every order granting an
injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance;
shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by refer-
ence to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained;
and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, ser-
vants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concern or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal ser-
vice or otherwise.
Id. (emphasis in original). The rule requires the injunction to be neither too broad nor
too vague. See, eg., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir.
1982) (injunction against infringement of trademark too vague). "[O]ne basic principle
built into Rule 65 is that those against whom an injunction is issued should receive fair
and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits." Granny Goose
Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974) (footnote omitted); see
also Litton Sys. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 957-58 (Fed. Cir. 1984); American
Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1984); Square Liner 360, Inc. v.
Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 378 (8th Cir. 1982); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408
F.2d 1108, 1113-17 (8th Cir. 1969).
Most courts, however, draft injunctions in general terms despite rule 65(d). See KSM
Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The unreasona-
bleness of a vague or broad prohibition is alleviated because contempt proceedings are
available only with respect to devices previously adjudged as infringing and to subse-
quently manufactured devices that are also deemed to be violations of the patent. Id.
A decision adjudging infringement necessarily finds the particular accused de-
vice to be within the valid boundary of the patent. The decree usually carries a
prohibition against further infringement-not as to any and every possible in-
fringement, but as to the particular device found to be [an] infringement and as
to all other devices which are merely 'colorable' changes of the infringing one or
of the patent. This limitation . . . is occasioned ... by the character of the
remedy-summary contempt proceedings-used to enforce such provisions of a
decree.
American Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1935).
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1982).
15. "In this day of... disrespect for the judicial process, the contempt power of the
courts may be an important weapon to restore respect for the judiciary." Nemmers,
Enforcement of Injunctive Orders and Decrees in Patent Cases, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 287, 288
(1973) (footnote omitted); see KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522,
1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp.. 768 F.2d 1001,
1022 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 802 (1986); MAC Corp. of Am. v. Williams
Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co., 767 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Smith Int'l, Inc. v.
Hughes Tool Co., 759 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 87 (1985); Polo
Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l, Inc., 760 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1985). Contempt
proceedings brought pursuant to a violation of an injunction protect the rights of the
patentee. See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (contempt proceedings, while primarily for the benefit of the patent owner, involve
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vided to the federal courts under 18 U.S.C. § 401,16 which enables courts
to punish by fine or imprisonment those who disobey or resist its
commands.17
When a patent owner who has enjoined an infringer faces a subsequent
possible infringement in the form of a modification of the infringing de-
vice, 18 he may either institute a separate suit to enjoin the modified de-
vice or urge the court to punish the violation of the injunction with
contempt.' 9 The contempt proceeding is of considerable value to the pat-
ent holder because it is usually summary, and decisions may be rendered
without the formalities and extra expense of a full trial."0
KSM's requirement that the patentee prove infringement of the patent
for every modified device that the infringer might manufacture subse-
quent to the injunction diminishes the significance of the patent and au-
the concept of an affront to the court for failure to obey its order); United States v.
Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 11 (3d Cir.) (contempt is part of an orderly institutional process to
resolve disputes and preserve respect for the courts and judicial orders), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) states:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to ob-
struct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree,
or command.
17. See id. Although contempt proceedings are usually summary, and may be de-
cided by the court on affidavits and exhibits without protracted proceedings, the patentee
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the injunction has been violated. See
generally 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2960, at 584-91
(1973).
18. See text accompanying infra notes 29-33.
19. See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The court has the discretion to decide if a contempt proceeding is appropriate. "If sub-
stantial issues need to be litigated, particularly if expert and other testimony subject to
cross-examination would be helpful or necessary, the court may properly require a sup-
plemental or new complaint." Id. at 1531; see Roche Prods., Inc., v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,
733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir.) (issuance of an injunction is clearly discretionary), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 183 (1984); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581
(Fed. Cir.) (injunctive relief against an infringer is the norm), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996
(1983); Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir.) (court must decide
whether to treat modified device as infringement de novo or whether summary contempt
is called for), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); United States v. Shiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 11
(3d Cir.) (contempt is part of an orderly institutional process to resolve disputes and
preserve respect for the courts and judicial orders), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
20. KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
While a patent owner, in such circumstances, could institute a separate suit to
enjoin the modified device, the advantages of proceeding on a motion to hold
his adversary in contempt are substantial. The adjudged infringer is already
under the jurisdiction of the court and may be summoned to appear to respond
on the merits, the contempt motion being merely part of the original action.
Contempt proceedings are generally summary in nature and may be decided by
the court on affidavits and exhibits without the formalities of a full trial ....
Id. (citation omitted).
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thority and respect for the court's orders.2" The contempt power would
lose its coercive influence.
At the same time, contempt is a harsh remedy that should not be un-
leashed haphazardly or indiscriminately.2" To allow a summary con-
tempt proceeding in all cases could deter parties from researching,
developing and marketing new devices that are legitimately outside the
scope of the patent for which the injunction had been granted.'
This Note will focus on what standard should determine whether the
injunction has been violated.24 In doing justice to the above interests,
can the court be granted the discretion to simply compare the modified
21. "[I]f a patentee could only attack each modified product in a new infringement
action, no matter how minimal the modification, such a requirement would significantly
diminish the force of a consent decree as a judgment of the court." Interdynamics, Inc. v.
Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
22. "Allowing the patentee to proceed by a summary contempt proceeding in all
cases would unnecessarily deter parties from marketing new devices that are legitimately
outside the scope of the patent in question." McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc.,
395 F.2d 230, 233 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968). A new infringement suit,
rather than contempt, is
by far the most appropriate one where it is really a doubtful question whether
the new [device] is an infringement or not. Process of contempt is a severe
remedy, and should not be resorted to where there is fair ground of doubt as to
the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.
California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885); see MAC
Corp. of Am. v. Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co., 767 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Kobrin, 719 F.2d 1114, 1118 (1lth Cir. 1983); In-
terdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943
(1965).
23. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 233 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968). "[C]ompeting interests... require ... balancing the rights
of a party ... to 'invent around' and avoid a patent it had earlier infringed." KSM
Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see United States
v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971) (due process considerations require con-
sent decrees be construed in accordance with circumstances under which they were en-
tered); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 n.8 (Fed. Cir.) ("The
burden of avoiding infringement at the risk of contempt falls upon the one enjoined."),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983); Marston v. J.C. Penney Co., 324 F. Supp. 889, 892
(E.D. Va. 1971) (patent owner may not, in contempt proceedings, seek to broaden scope
of claims and thereby catch the modified device), aff'dper curiam, 469 F.2d 694, 695 (4th
Cir. 1972).
24. Close analysis reveals that there are really two questions involved: First, may the
patentee proceed via a contempt proceeding (or do the facts dictate that a full infringe-
ment trial is more equitable)? Second, if the court decides that contempt proceedings are
appropriate, what criteria shall be used to determine if the injunction has been violated?
The answer to the first question establishes the dividing point between those cases that
should be handled in a summary contempt proceeding and those cases that should be
more fully viewed in an infringement proceeding. Some guidance on what criteria should
be employed in making this determination was provided in McCullough Tool Co. v. Well
Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968):
Obviously there must be a dividing point between those cases which should be
handled by a summary contempt proceeding and those cases which should be
more fully viewed in an infringement proceeding. Courts have uniformly held
that the standard to be applied in determining the dividing point is whether the
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device to its predecessor (a previously adjudicated patent violation) and
hold that if the modified device is only "colorably" different 25 that the
manufacturer is in contempt?2 6 Or, must the modified device be com-
pared, instead, to the original patent, as the KSM court mandated?
27
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE KSM DECISION
The traditional standard2" for determining contempt prior to the KSM
case was set forth in Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf,29 which stated
that to find contempt, a court must compare the enjoined device with the
accused device3° under a "doctrine of equivalents."'" This doctrine
states: "[I]f two devices do the same work in substantially the same way,
and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even
though different in name, form, or shape."'3 2 Under this test, if the de-
vices are equivalent, contempt will lie.33
KSM brought suit against Jones for infringement of a patented
anchoring device.34 A settlement was reached35 and Jones, conceding
the infringement, entered into a consent decree36 and was enjoined from
further infringement.37 Jones subsequently manufactured a "modified"
anchoring device,38 and KSM urged the district court to hold Jones in
contempt for violation of the injunction. 39 The district court applied the
Interdynamics test and concluded that the difference between the adjudi-
cated device and the accused device was only "colorable." 40 Therefore,
alleged offending device is 'merely "colorably" different from the enjoined de-
vice or from the patent.'
Id. at 233 (quoting Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 943 (1965). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 20.
27. See KSM, 776 F.2d at 1528.
28. See id. at 1527.
29. 653 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
30. See id. at 98-99.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 99 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950)). The KSM court erroneously attributed this doctrine to Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950), when in fact it was articulated by
the Supreme Court more than a century ago in Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877). See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(attention is drawn to this solely for the purpose of demonstrating that this test is not a
neophyte to patent law).
33. Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 98-99 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
34. KSM Div. of Omark Indus. v. H.A. Jones Co., No. 79 Civ. 1350 (D.N.J. Mar. 6,
1980).
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2.
38. KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones, Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1527-28.
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Jones was in contempt.4
On appeal, Jones prevailed because the Federal Circuit rejected42 the
Interdynamics test, vacated the judgment of contempt and remanded the
case for comparison of the accused device with the patent rather than
with the enjoined device.4 3 The court held that when an injunction has
been violated, the trial court is required "at a minimum" to find that the
accused device is an "infringement."" The court's holding means that in
future contempt proceedings courts will always have to return to the pat-
ent claims and consider questions of claim interpretation, 5 prior art 6
and prosecution history47 estoppel.48 This makes it difficult for a court to
grant summary relief49 because a comparison of the accused device and
the patent requires the court to analyze and weigh more issues than
would a comparison of two devices.50
41. Id. at 1524.
42. Id. at 1527.
43. See id. at 1530-32.
44. See id. at 1532.
45. See, eg., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000-01 (Fed. Cir.
1986); KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc.,
'76 F.2d 281, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986);
SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
46. See, eg., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Kangaroos U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tita-
nium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Block v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tyler Refrigeration v. Kysor
Indus. Corp., 777 F.2d 687, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47. See Great N. Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 786 F.2d 159, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 324 (Fed. Cir. 1985); CPG Prods. Corp.
v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1985); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1119-20, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Davis, J.,
concurring).
48. KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1536-37 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The majority has eased the way to enabling an adjudged infringer to oblige a
court to retry any colorable modification the infringer can create, with fresh
consideration of prior art and prosecution history, renewed claim interpreta-
tion, and the trappings of discovery and expert witnesses that accompany trial
of these issues. By thus reducing the discretionary possibility of summary relief
in contempt proceedings, harassing litigation will be harder to control.
Id. at 1536 (Newman, J., concurring in part).
49. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
50. Due to ever rapid advances in science and technology, patent cases present pro-
tracted and complex litigations. Wright, U.S. Patent System and the Judiciary, 47 J. Pat.
Off. Soe'y 727, 728 (1965). Because of the complexity of the issues (e.g., gene splicing)
and the necessarily technical testimony of expert witnesses, patent lawyers usually pos-
sess expertise in at least one scientific discipline. "We are ... aware that . .. patent
litigation can present issues so complex that legal minds, without appropriate grounding
in science and technology, may have difficulty ...." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 (1971); see Harries v. Air King Prods. Co.,
183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.) (Patent litigation can be "as fugitive,
impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal
concepts .... If there be an issue more troublesome, or more apt for litigation than this,
we are unaware of it.); Note, "To Bind or Not to Bind" Bar and Merger Treatment of
Consent Decrees in Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1322 (1974)
1986] 1011
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KSM is significant because it deprives the victor in an infringement
litigation of the inexpensive, uncomplicated and summary protection he
is entitled to when there is no genuine dispute in a contempt proceed-
ing.5 For all practical purposes, this forces the victorious patentee to
relitigate all the issues settled in the initial injunction proceeding against
the infringer.52 While this may be advisable in some circumstances, the
court mandated that this procedure always be followed.53 This necessar-
ily includes those situations in which a trial court, in its discretion, does
not deem it necessary to relitigate these questions or where res judicata
may apply.54 In the interest of judicial efficiency the trial court should
retain the discretion to decide whether, for a particular modified device,
justice would best be served by a simplified, relatively inexpensive and
summary contempt procedure. 55
Res judicata principles are "the essence of judicial judgments," signifi-
cantly contributing to judicial efficiency and giving judgments their force
as ultimate resolutions.56 Among the benefits derived from these princi-
ples are: reducing workload of the courts, discouraging piecemeal and
repetitive litigation, promoting financial investment and business enter-
prise (due to certainty of legal relations) and fostering respect for judicial
("The concerns of effective judicial administration and fairness to litigants are particu-
larly present in patent litigation because of the staggering cost, volume and complexity of
patent cases.") [hereinafter cited as Consent Decrees in Litigation].
51. See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part) ("I know of no reason to withdraw from trial courts the
authority ... to find contempt summarily .... Most of the circuits have heretofore
recognized the need for discretion in district courts to handle contempt cases simply and
expeditiously, when the facts warrant. The majority ruling limits this discretion."); see
also SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Cable
Elec. Prod., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Molinaro v.
Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 653-54 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Chore-Time Equip., Inc.
v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma
Wolf, Inc., 653 F.2d 93, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Brunswick Corp.
v. Chrysler Corp., 408 F.2d 335, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1969); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d
474, 477 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965).
52. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
53. See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part).
54. See id.
55. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter Eng'g, Co.,
655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981); Windm~ller v. Laguerre, 284 F. Supp. 563, 564-65
(D.D.C. 1968).
56. See Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1322; see, e.g., USM Corp. v.
SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Precision Air Parts, Inc. v.
Avco Corp., 736 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 966 (1985);
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 187 (1984); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1983); Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 98-99 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 408 F.2d 335, 337-38




decrees.57 "Moreover, individual litigants are afforded relief from the
vexation and economic hardship of repeated and wasteful actions. The
concerns of effective judicial administration and fairness to litigants are
particularly present in patent litigation because of the staggering cost, vol-
ume and complexity of patent cases." 8 While the KSM holding59 may
comfort potential contemnors-and practitioners of patent law-it is the
antithesis of these principles of judicial administration.
The contempt proceeding is an essential weapon in the judicial arsenal
protecting public interest in both the finality and authority of court de-
crees.' Under KSM, adjudication is "final" only so long as the adjudi-
57. See Precision Air Parts, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 736 F.2d 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 966 (1985):
By declaring an end to litigation, the doctrine adds certainty and stability to
social institutions. This certainty in turn generates public respect for the courts.
By preventing relitigation of issues, res judicata conserves judicial time and re-
sources. It also supports several private interests, including avoidance of sub-
stantial litigation expenses, protection from harassment or coercion by lawsuit,
and avoidance of conflicting rights and duties from inconsistent judgments.
Id. at 1503 n.4 (quoting Southwest Airlines v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 94 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977)). The contempt citation is intended to embody res
judicata principles.
Just as a contempt citation based on a consent judgment is a vindiction of the
court's authority, so is application of res judicata to a consent decree in a sec-
ond action. In both cases, the interests of society, the parties and the courts in
giving certainty and conclusiveness to judgments of the court are the same.
Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1337.
58. Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1322 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added); see Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
334-49 (1971); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035, 1037 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter Eng'g, Co.,
655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981); Windmller v. Laguerre, 284 F. Supp. 563, 564-65
(D.D.C. 1968). See generally Harris, Cost of Enforcement of Industrial Rights, 13 Idea,
Conference Number 1969, 51, 53 (1969) (even simple patent cases are very expensive and
complex ones can involve millions of dollars).
59. See supra notes 30 and 45.
60. Infringement litigation is often settled by parties via a consent decree in which the
alleged infringer permits the entry of a decree enjoining future infringement. See Nem-
mers, supra note 15, at 301-02; Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1325,
1330. Some have argued that because consent decrees are often entered into and ap-
proved by the courts without a full trial or litigation on the merits, they should not be
accorded the same respect and finality as decrees that result from full adjudication. See
Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1327-28; see also Horn & Epstein, The
Federal Courts' View of Patents--A Different View, 55 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 134 (1973).
Strictly speaking, one could argue that the merits had not been adjudicated, but
"[w]hether right or wrong, the courts draw no distinction in contempt cases between the
effect of a decree entered by consent and one entered after a complete and contested
proceeding." Nemmers, supra note 15, at 292. A patent dispute settled by a consent
decree is deemed a final adjudication and the courts generally agree that the issues of
infringement and validity cannot be relitigated in civil contempt proceedings. Id. at 301.
"To allow such issues to be raised in a later civil contempt proceeding would be to allow a
collateral attack on the decree." Id. at 301-02. If these collateral attacks are allowed,
patentees may choose not to enter into consent decrees in the future.
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cated infringer wishes it to be. By simply manufacturing a slightly
modified device he gets the proverbial "second bite at the apple."', "Fi-
nal" adjudication means nothing because a civil contempt proceeding
now requires so thorough a legal reanalysis6" that it cannot accommo-
date simple summary procedures and forces the patentee to relitigate the
rights granted in the original infringement action.63 Prior to KSM the
patentee could either initiate a new infringement action or a summary
contempt proceeding. 4 Because KSM makes the two remedies coexten-
sive,65 logic dictates that the summary contempt proceeding has been
purloined from the patentee. Thus, the court has condoned collateral
attacks on the court's decree.66
Strictly read, KSM does not impinge or vitiate patent contempt pro-
ceedings, but it has strewn many obstacles in the path of the patentee
seeking to avail himself of its redress. No practical difference remains
between this post-KSM contempt proceeding and a new suit to enjoin the
accused device.67 It follows that if the patent contempt proceeding is
now indistinguishable from a new infringement proceeding, the patent
contempt proceeding has at best been stultified and at worst eviscerated.
The KSM holding has severely retarded the future effectiveness of this
In essence this ... involves a very important principle, namely, whether sanc-
tity should be accorded to a consent decree of a Federal Court in a patent-
infringement case.
We ought to do nothing here to make the settlement of a patent-infringement
action by a consent decree a futile, meaningless gesture which will discourage
such settlements in the future.
Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 783 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
912 (1976); see Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 n.8 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983); United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430
F.2d 998, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1970); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 343 F. Supp.
225, 228 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
61. "[E]lementary logic is matched by elementary fairness-a litigant given one good
bite at the apple should not have a second." Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision
Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984).
[I]n a consent decree situation, the parties have suffered no incapacity or disa-
bility to challenge when they first went to court. Providing an unmuzzled party
who unsuccessfully-and perhaps lackadaisically-challenged the validity of a
patent with a second chance on the same issue against the same party offends
fundamental notions of fair play ....
See Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1347. This second chance should be
denied in the interest of judicial efficiency and to prevent endless litigation. See Smith
Int'l, Inc, v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996
(1983).
62. KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part).
63. Id. at 1536.
64. See supra notes 3, 19 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 20-21, 24, 48.
PATENT CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
remedy. 68 By denying the patentee this summary remedy the Federal
Circuit has removed much of the incentive for patentees to enter into
consent agreements.69
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE KSM MANDATE
A court may approach these contempt issues in one of three ways.
One way is the Interdynamics ° approach of comparing the adjudicated
device with the accused device to see if they differ more than colorably.7 '
This approach has been followed in several circuits. 2 The second ap-
proach is that of the Fourth Circuit, which has held that "[e]quivalency
must be determined with reference to the patented structure, rather than
the articles earlier found to infringe, for the injunction grants no rights
that the patent did not confer." 3 This approach resembles KSM by not
allowing a comparison of the accused and adjudicated devices. It is
much more rigorous than the Interdynamics test since it requires a com-
parison to the patent, which entails an examination of claim interpreta-
tion, prior art and prosecution history estoppel.
"Most circuits have favored a middle ground" which grants the trial
court the discretion "to determine how much relitigation may be re-
quired in the interest of justice." 4 The Sixth Circuit has required its
courts to question "whether the accused structure is equivalent to the
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. If a patentee were required to relitigate that which it had settled by consent,
perhaps having made extensive compromises to obtain the settlement, then pat-
entees would lack incentive to enter into settlements while accused infringers
could obtain both favorable settlements and the right to challenge that which
had been settled.
KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Newman,
J., concurring in part). If the patentee can be put to the expense of reestablishing the
scope of his patent and its congruence with the modified device, and if these "rights could
be reopened at the option of an infringer, patentees would lack incentive to enter into
settlements." Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); see Consent Decrees in Litigation, supra note 50, at 1348.
70. Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
71. See id.
72. See, eg., Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Kobrin, 719 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (1 1th Cir. 1983);
Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 18 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230,
234 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 476-
77 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); Hopp Press, Inc. v. Joseph Freeman &
Co., 323 F.2d 636, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1963).
73. Marston v. J.C. Penney Co., 324 F. Supp. 889, 893 (E.D. Va. 1971), ajTd per
curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1972). "The patent owner may not, in contempt proceed-
ings, seek to broaden the scope of the claims which were adjudicated and, thereby catch
the modified device." KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1529 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
74. KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part).
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original in relation to the patent in suit."75 Under its approach, determi-
nation of infringement requires analysis of: "(1) the equivalency of the
modified structures to the structures previously held infringing, and
(2) the relationship of the new devices to the valid patent claim."'7 6 The
court was careful to point out that the proper time to test the validity of
the patent claim and examine "the prior art in great detail" is when the
original infringement suit is brought.77 This combines the Interdynamics
and KSM approaches. This approach's requirement of both analyses
makes summary dispositions difficult.
The Fifth Circuit authorized limited review of the patent "not on the
settled issue of validity, but solely on the critical question of equivalency
between the modified and adjudicated structures."7" Thus, the court
must look at the patent, but only for the purpose of gaining better insight
when comparing the adjudged and accused devices.79 This approach was
also followed by the Eleventh Circuit."° This formula protects the rights
of the patentee and the infringer, while maintaining the integrity of the
contempt remedy.
Reliance on the doctrine of equivalents will protect [the patentee's]
right to the benefit of its prior judgment while reserving to [the in-
fringer] the opportunity to invent around the... patent.... When
applying the doctrine of equivalents in the present case, it was neces-
sary for the district court to compare the modified ... assembly to the
infringing assembly, while bearing in mind its previous construction
(during the infringement litigation) of the claims in the ... patent and
the scope of their protection.
8 1
Thus, the trial court retains the discretion to grant summary contempt
relief by comparing the accused device with the enjoined device, with the
patent serving as a backdrop. 2 In the alternative, if the court thinks the
devices are more than colorably different and that genuine issues of fact
exist, the court can compare the accused device to the patent in a full
infringement suit rather than a contempt proceeding.8 3
If disposition of summary contempt proceedings is to be speeded, the
courts must be unencumbered by an approach that must be used regard-
75. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1240, 1241 (W.D.
Mich. 1972), affid per curiam, 476 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 1241-42.
77. Id. at 1242.
78. E-I-M Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Works, Inc., 223 F.2d 36, 41 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 933 (1956).
79. See KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring in part).
80. See Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Kobrin, 719 F.2d 1114, 1117 (11th Cir. 1983) ("These
issues depended for their resolution... upon the scope of the claims in the... patent and
the differences between [the] modified mirror assembly and the assembly previously
found to be infringing.").
81. Id. at 1118.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1119.
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less of the facts of the case. A fact-specific approach in each case would
promote judicial efficiency by maximizing the use of judicial resources.
In deciding if contempt should lie, the court should have the discretion-
depending on the degree of colorable difference--to compare 1) the ac-
cused device with the adjudicated device,84 or 2) the accused device with
the adjudicated device with a limited review of the patent serving as a
backdrop for the comparison,85 or 3) the accused device with the original
patent claims.86 These standards protect the patentee's interests in his
patent, 87 preserve the potential contemnor's incentive to invent around
the patent, 88 preserve the authority and validity of both the court's de-
cree and its power to punish violations of the decree,89 and honor the
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.9
CONCLUSION
Until KSM, a patentee could rely on a "summary contempt" proceed-
ing to both inhibit and punish subsequent infringements. KSM has made
"summary" and "contempt" mutually exclusive by requiring comparison
of the accused device to the patent before the court can determine that
contempt will lie. This places the burden of expensive and time-consum-
ing relitigation on the patentee and thwarts the policies of res judicata
and collateral estoppel.
To protect the rights of the patentee and to promote the public policy
of encouraging manufacturers and inventors to design around patents,
this Note advocates that the Federal Circuit expand its holding in KSM.
In determining if contempt should lie, the district court should have dis-
cretion to compare the accused device to the adjudicated device, or the
accused device to the adjudicated device with a limited review of the
patent serving as a backdrop for the comparison, or the accused device
with the original patent claims. Which procedure, or combination of
procedures, is warranted should be based on the court's initial impression
of the degree of "colorable difference" between the accused device and
the adjudicated device. Thus, where a subsequent infringement is egre-
gious, the contempt proceeding may be summarily disposed of by com-
paring the accused to the adjudged device. Not all modified devices
violate injunctions. Indeed, some devices may be so novel that compari-
son to the patent is justified. When it appears that the accused device
may be the product of legitimate design around the patent, the interests
of justice may indeed require the more protracted analysis.
84. See supra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 81.
86. See supra note 5.
87. See supra notes 1, 21 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
89. See 8 A. Deller, supra note 4, at 522-36 (2d ed. 1973). See supra notes 5. 13, 16
and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 56, 62 and accompanying text.
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This hierarchy, invoked at the discretion of the court, will promote the
public policy of encouraging genuine invention around patents while still
providing the patentee with an unencumbered and inexpensive summary
contempt remedy when the accused device has been only colorably modi-
fied to circumvent the injunction.
John E. Tsavaris II
